French MEP Raphaël Glucksmann. support Ukraine. russian fakes

The target of the campaign was Raphaël Glucksmann — a French MEP known for his consistent support of Ukraine and criticism of putin's policies. The politician himself confirmed that he filed a complaint with French law enforcement following a targeted campaign against him.

According to French authorities, the attack was organized by the Storm-1516 network, which is linked to russian military intelligence: https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/raphael-glucksmann-confirme-avoir-porte-plainte-apres-une-ingerence-russe-le-visant-20260812 Within a week, at least seven fake videos were detected on TikTok, which, at the time of writing, have not been removed by the platform. They mimic the branding and logos of authoritative Western media outlets — Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, Bellingcat, BFM TV, AFP, and Politico.  
Disguised as "investigative journalism," these videos spread fabricated allegations against Glucksmann and individuals associated with him —ranging from invented criminal stories and deaths to false statements by religious and media figures.  
Overall, the network behind this campaign is accused of conducting at least 205 similar operations in Europe. A characteristic feature of this content is its bilingual structure: a short description under the video is provided in English (presumably for broader international reach), while the text directly on the video is in French, calculated for the local audience. Another telling indicator is the abnormal engagement structure: each video on TikTok gathered over 1,000–1,200 shares (reposts), while garnering only 25–50 likes, with virtually no comments or saves. Such a disproportion between mass reposts and minimal organic user reaction is a typical sign of coordinated/boosted distribution rather than natural content virality.  
Another interesting detail is the inclusion of links to genuine media websites in the video clips, which are actually unclickable because they are plain text rather than hyperlinks. This was likely done by the disinformers to increase the credibility of their claims. No such articles exist on the specified domains.  
Here are a few examples of the fakes:
● Fake disguised as Le Monde: Claims that the underage daughter of Ubisoft's CEO allegedly had an abortion following a relationship with Glucksmann.  ● Fake disguised as Libération: Claims that the editor-in-chief of Le Figaro allegedly condemned Glucksmann's initiative to introduce a tax on Europeans to support Ukraine.  ● Fake disguised as AFP: Claims that the Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris allegedly condemned Glucksmann for stating that there are "no human beings in the Gaza Strip."  
No confirmation of these claims was found in open sources. For example, Ubisoft CEO Yves Guillemot does not have a daughter; he has a son named Charlie Guillemot.  
The russians deliberately and regularly attack Western politicians who openly speak out against putin's terrorist regime. As electoral processes approach in any given country, these attacks only intensify. It is vital to always remember the essence of the russian government — terrorism, enslavement, manipulation, and coercion into conditions favorable to russia.
A Bloomberg investigation exposed the activities of the russian propaganda network Storm-1516 (Neva Flood), which has become one of the kremlin's key tools of information warfare: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-russia-disinformation-storm-1516-videos 
According to journalists, the entity uses artificial intelligence, deepfakes, and "narrative laundering" technology to conceal the russian origin of fakes and mass-distribute disinformation. How the scheme works:First, fake content is created—often featuring puppet "experts" or generated videos. Next, it is published on obscure platforms (particularly in Africa or the Middle East) to create the illusion of an independent source. After that, a network of anonymous accounts and "influencers" massively boosts the material across social networks. In the final stage, the fake is picked up by russian state media.  
Over 40% of the information attacks are directed against Ukraine: fakes are spread about "corruption," the "luxurious lifestyle" of leadership, and other narratives designed to undermine trust in the state and reduce partner support.  
The network has also interfered in political processes in Europe and the US— specifically spreading election-related fakes and discrediting candidates. According to intelligence data, Unit 29155 of the russian Ministry of Defense stands behind Storm-1516, while the coordination of information operations is linked to sergey kiriyenko from the Presidential Administration. The scale of the operation is significant: in 2026 alone, the kremlin plans to spend around $1.8 billion on state media and online propaganda.  
The French organization Forbidden Stories revealed that russian intelligence uses "The Company" network to form an anti-Western belt stretching from Guinea to Sudan: https://forbiddenstories.org/sahel-journalists-activists-ngos-russian-agents/ 
Countries in the sphere of influence: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Togo. Operational mechanics of the network: Funding editorial boards and local journalists in exchange for materials that mimic independent journalism.  
Recruiting local opinion leaders and officials (contacts in Togo cost nearly $5,500). Covering operations through "cultural" entities such as "russian House." Next stage: Promoting the model to coastal West African states with access to key logistics hubs. The first signs of resistance are already being recorded: Angola is strengthening counteractions against large-scale disinformation campaigns.  
OpenAI blocked a network of accounts associated with the russian media outlet "Rybar."
OpenAI released a new report on attempts to abuse its AI models. Among those exposed is a network of accounts linked to russian propagandists: https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-ai-uses/  
According to researchers, accounts connected to "Rybar" used ChatGPT for:Creating propaganda content for social networks in russian, English, and Spanish.  
Generating comments in English that were published from accounts not formally linked to the brand. Preparing materials for the "Rybar" website and social channels. Creating videos in Sora to promote the brand. Certain queries involved preparing commercial proposals for covert interference campaigns in Africa.  
The estimated budget for the largest project reached up to $600,000 per year. The report notes that the generated content aligns with typical russian information operation patterns: glorifying russia and its allies, discrediting Ukraine, and accusing the West of "interference."
Criminal groups recruit teenagers via social networks to carry out contract killings.
The Tehran-linked criminal group "Foxtrot" recruits teenagers through social networks and messaging apps to carry out contract killings and attacks, reports the BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrjyevmv61o According to investigative reporting, the network has been suspected of involvement in roughly 35 murders since 2022, as well as attacks on targets linked to Israel. 
European law enforcement believes that after the group's leader, Rawa Majid, relocated to Iran, "Foxtrot" began executing tasks for the Iranian regime. According to Europol, young perpetrators are recruited on social media, and the "tasks" themselves are presented in a gamified format resembling computer games. Teenagers are promised large financial rewards, though most are arrested prior to or immediately after committing the crimes.  
To counter this threat, 11 European states established a joint operational task force, GRIMM, which has already made over 280 arrests. Law enforcement stresses that transnational criminal networks are increasingly used by authoritarian regimes as tools for sabotage, political violence, and intimidation on European territory.  
The European Union introduced mandatory labeling for AI-generated content to counter disinformation.
New transparency requirements for content created using artificial intelligence came into force in the European Union: https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/safer-and-more-transparent-ai-2026-08-02_en From now on, deepfakes, generated images, audio, video materials, and other AI content that could mislead people must be clearly labeled.  
The European Commission explained that the rapid development of AI technologies makes it difficult to recognize genuine content, creating risks for the spread of disinformation, fraud, manipulation, and impersonation. For this reason, users must be clearly informed when interacting with a chatbot, AI avatar, or other digital service rather than a real person. Compliance will be monitored by national regulators and relevant EU bodies. Violations could result in fines of up to 15 million euros or 3% of a company's global annual turnover. The new rules are part of the phased implementation of the AI Act—the world's first comprehensive EU law aimed at making AI use safer and more transparent. 
Based on materials from Stopfake.org, Spravdi.ua
Read more: Fake: EU and Ukraine systematically interferes in elections in Western countries